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The Pricing Mistake That Cost Me Two Years of Growth

  • Chris Thierry
  • Jun 5, 2025
  • 4 min read

Updated: Jun 9

We launched at $49 per month per user. I thought it was a smart, accessible price point that would let us acquire customers quickly and expand later. What actually happened is we attracted customers who valued price over product, created a support burden that nearly bankrupted us, and trained the market to see us as a low-cost option in a category where value pricing was the norm.

It took two years to undo the damage. Two years of repositioning, repricing, and having uncomfortable conversations with existing customers. If I could go back and change one decision from our early days, this would be it.

The Psychology of Underpricing

Founders underprice for emotional reasons, not rational ones. We're afraid that if we charge more, nobody will buy. We don't believe our product is worth premium pricing yet. We think low prices will help us win market share that we can monetize later.

All of these feel logical in the moment. None of them hold up under scrutiny. The truth is, price is a signal. In B2B SaaS, a low price doesn't communicate accessibility — it communicates low value. When a VP of Operations is evaluating three solutions and yours is a third of the price, they don't think "great deal." They think "what's wrong with it?"

We lost deals to competitors who charged three times more than us. Not because their product was better — in many cases it wasn't — but because their price communicated confidence in their solution. Our price communicated uncertainty.

The Hidden Cost of Cheap Customers

Here's what nobody tells you about pricing low: you attract the worst customers. Not bad people, but the wrong fit. Customers who chose you primarily on price will leave you the moment someone cheaper shows up. They have the highest support ticket volume because they're often less sophisticated buyers. They negotiate hardest on renewals. They rarely expand.

Our cheapest customers generated 60% of our support tickets and 15% of our revenue. That ratio was destroying our unit economics, and we didn't even realize it until we finally did the cohort analysis.

Meanwhile, the handful of customers who were paying us a premium — because we'd custom-quoted them before we had standard pricing — were our happiest accounts. They had dedicated onboarding, they used the product fully, and they expanded year over year. The price gave them confidence that they were getting a serious solution.

The Framework I Use Now

When I work with founders on pricing, I start with three questions. What is the quantifiable value your product delivers to a customer? If you can save a company $500,000 per year in operational costs, your product should cost at minimum 10% of that. If you can't articulate the value in dollar terms, you have a positioning problem before you have a pricing problem.

What do your best customers pay, and what do your worst customers pay? Almost always, there's an inverse relationship between price and customer quality. The customers paying the most are the easiest to serve and the most likely to renew. Price accordingly.

Would you rather have 100 customers at $500 per month or 20 customers at $2,500 per month? The math is the same, but the businesses are completely different. Twenty customers require less support, less infrastructure, and give you more leverage for upselling. Most founders default to the high-volume model because it feels safer. It's not.

How to Raise Prices Without Losing Everyone

When we finally raised prices, I was terrified. We went from $49 to $149 per user per month — a 3x increase — and repackaged the offering with tiered features. Here's what happened.

We lost about 30% of our customer base. Mostly the customers who were costing us the most to serve. Our revenue barely dipped because those were our lowest-paying accounts. Within two quarters, we had more than recovered the lost revenue through new customers who came in at the higher price point. And our support costs dropped by 40%.

The key was transparency. We gave existing customers 90 days notice, offered a 12-month loyalty rate for annual commitments, and personally called our top 20 accounts to walk them through the change. The accounts that mattered stayed. The ones that left freed up capacity to serve the remaining customers better.

Price Is a Feature

The biggest mindset shift I had to make was understanding that price is not separate from your product. Price is a feature. It shapes who your customer is, how they perceive your solution, and how they use it. Customers who pay more invest more in adoption, demand better outcomes, and stay longer.

I see founders every week making the same mistake I made. They're sitting on a product that delivers real value, and they're charging a fraction of what it's worth because they're scared of rejection. The market is not going to tell you to charge more. You have to decide that your product is worth it and price accordingly.

The two years I spent underpriced weren't wasted — I learned lessons that now save the founders I work with from making the same mistake. But if I could send a message back in time to my younger self, it would be this: charge more. Charge significantly more. Your best customers will thank you for it.

If you're building a SaaS company and want a partner who's been in your shoes, let's talk. Book a call at cal.com/christopher-thierry/30min

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